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Abstract. Some emotions, described as “basic” in the literature, are al-
most reflexes. Other emotions are triggered via pattern matching mech-
anisms operating on specific mental states (most often epistemic and
motivational) to determine the (in)congruence of these states. Yet other
emotions come from more or less complex cognitive mechanisms (and
we thus call them complex emotions) such as counterfactual reasoning
(e.g. guilt or regret), normative judgement (e.g. shame or pride), proba-
bilistic evaluations of the world (e.g. surprise), etc.. In the following, we
study and formalise the complex emotion of shame that is of particular
importance in social behaviour, and illustrate it on some scenarios.
Keywords: emotions, shame, modal logic
1 Introduction
Elster [1, p. 145] highlights “an immensely powerful influence” of social norms
on behaviour. In particular, shame touches us in what is most intimate and per-
sonal because it has a strong influence on our self-image and the way we believe
to be socially perceived [2]. According to Elster, shame is the support of social
norms: for instance, if an agent violates a social norm, we can refuse to deal
with it, which may make it shameful; and the more it costs us to refuse to deal
with it, the most important its shame will be [1, p. 146]. In other words, shame
influences our social behaviour. It is thus an emotion of the greatest importance,
but paradoxically very little studied in computer science. The goal of this paper
is to propose a fine-grained formalization of shame, allowing individual agents
to adopt an appropriate behaviour in particular circumstances. Possible applica-
tions include entertainment (e.g. role-playing games) or education (e.g. serious
games, tutoring systems). For instance, if a pedagogical agent detects that its
student is ashamed of speaking English because he does not feel confident in
his ability, it could decide to set up strategies to reassure him. Reasoning about
the user’s shame can be used in anticipation to decide (not) to perform a given
action. Our longer-term goal is to use shame (of one agent in front of the oth-
ers) as the motor of the dynamics of a multi-agent system (see perspectives in
conclusion of this paper).
According to Scherer’s multi-componential view [3], emotions are “episodes”
having a certain duration (very short but not instantaneous) and a certain dy-
namics. The following components win almost unanimous support in psychol-
ogy: the sentiment (the feeling of the emotion); the psychophysiological response
(e.g. acceleration of heart rate, body temperature increase); the motor expres-
sion (e.g. face, voice, gestures); the action tendency (not to be confused with
the action itself); and the cognitive appraisal.
In cognitive appraisal theories, this last component causes the other four; it
represents the cognitive process of evaluating a given stimulus and triggering a
differentiated emotional response (i.e. it determines which emotion is triggered).
As a result, the cognitive structure of emotions is a mental state, that similarly to
belief, desire, intention, etc. refers to a state or an object of the world. Therefore
emotions are always about something (the object of the appraisal).
In the following, we set up to characterise the cognitive structure of shame.
In order to not excessively complicate our study, we do not study the aspects
linked to its intensity (on this topic see e.g. Lorini [4]). In Section 2 we analyse
the emotion of shame; we then present our formal framework in Section 3; we
use our formal framework in Section 4 to provide a logical characterisation of
shame (mainly following Castelfranchi and Poggi’s conceptualisation [5]) and to
illustrate different uses of this emotion on some scenarios. Finally we discuss
related works in Section 5 before concluding in Section 6.
2 Shame
Shame has been largely studied in psychology [6, 7, 2, 8, 9]. This emotion is per-
ceived as negative, and we are particularly sensitive to it because it makes us
focus on our person as a whole, on the damage to our image and to our face
(Lewis [10]). Elster [1, pp. 152–153] says that in the case of guilt one sees oneself
as having done something bad, while in the case of shame one sees oneself as
a bad person. Shame plays a key social role: it has “the function of cognitive
mediators of the individual’s social behaviour. (...) Though the unpleasant feel-
ings they inflict they lead one to avoid or remediate possible misfunctioning in
one’s relationships with other people.” [5, p. 230]. Lazarus highlights that even if
shame can be seen as occurring privately and without any witnesses, it actually
always involves other people [8, p. 241].
Shame is mainly linked to the belief of having violated an internalised norma-
tive standard[11]3. Following [9, p. 142–143], this norm is an “important moral
value” that one feels committed to respect and whose violation is considered as
inexcusable. According to Lazarus [8, p. 240 & 242], shame involves thoughts or
actions that violate an “internalised social prescription” and where the blame is
3 Typically, an agent can be aware of a normative standard (in a general sense,
e.g. moral value, legal obligations, etc.) without internalising it if this agent does
not identify with it, i.e. it does not consider it important to respect it. This does
not mean that an agent necessarily respects all its internalised norms, but it cannot
be indifferent to their violation. For example, if one believes that it is forbidden to
download music online but still does, it means that they did not internalise that law.
for oneself (see also [9, pp. 136–144]). But finally we agree with Turrini et al. when
they claim that the norms involved in shame are not necessarily moral values
but rather normative standards (e.g. being ashamed of one’s nose or poverty).
We also agree with Castelfranchi and Poggi [5] on another important aspect
of shame: one can feel shame in front of oneself and/or in front of someone else.4
Elster [1, p. 151] quotes the example of Mathilde de la Mole who is ashamed5
of being in love with the son of a carpenter (Julien Sorel): ss long as she has
not told anyone about her secret, she only feels shame in front of herself; only
when she thinks (rightly or wrongly) that other people are aware of her feelings
does she feel shame in front of them. A corollary to this is that to feel shame
w.r.t. others, it is necessary to believe that they are aware of the object of our
shame [5]. Of course, as highlighted by these authors, one can project oneself in
the future and imagine the shame that one would feel if one’s relatives were aware
of something. Lazarus [8, p. 241] defends the idea that it is only necessary to
imagine how some people would react if they knew what we did or did not do in
order to feel shame for it. But in this case, [5] argue that shame in front of one’s
relatives is not really felt but just imagined, thus contradicting Lazarus. Elster
[1, p. 152] imposes a stronger condition by mentioning the “presence of others”
but it seems that this condition is not confirmed by experiments in psychology
(see [2, p. 14] for example, who showed that a significant number of queried
people reported experiences of shame arising when they were alone).
As we can see from this psychological literature review, theories are often
vague and/or ambiguous, and do not agree on all details of the definition of
shame. We thus had to choose one theory to formalise, and we chose to follow
Castelfranchi and Poggi’s cognitive analysis [5, p. 233], which seems the most
adapted to a BDI logical formalisation. According to this theory, the fact that an
agent i feels shame about a fact F in front of an agent j requires four conditions
(that we put in parallel with their own example of a doctor ashamed in front
of their patient for not knowing a new medicine, making him a bad doctor):
(1) agent i believes that j believes that F is true (e.g. the doctor believes that
his patient believes that he does not know about this new medicine); (2) agent
i believes that j believes that if F is true then agent i is negatively appraised
w.r.t. a certain criterion C (e.g. the doctor believes that according to his patient,
ignorance of this new medicine makes him a bad doctor); (3) agent i believes that
i and j commonly believe that the criterion C is a shared normative standard
for them both (e.g. the doctor and his patient commonly believe that it is a
normative standard to be a good doctor); (4) finally, agent i is not indifferent to
j’s opinion of him w.r.t. C. In other words, i prefers j to have a positive opinion
of him with respect to C, i.e. to believe that he has this property C (e.g. the
doctor prefers his patient to think that he is a good doctor).
4 The expression “in front of” designates in [5] the person (or the group of people),
physically present or not, w.r.t. whom one feels a given emotion.
5 Given that she violates a social norm important to her, i.e. that a noble woman
should not fall in love with someone of an inferior social rank
This last point is in agreement with Lazarus [8, p. 241], according to whom
in shame, there is a potentially critical person (regarding the negative state that
we are ashamed of) whose approbation is important to us.
It is important to note that when i and j are the same agent, this agent is
ashamed in front of itself [5]. Moreover, agent i can be ashamed in front of agent
j even if it does not itself share j’s beliefs imposed in conditions (1) and (2), as
long as it believes that j does have these beliefs (e.g. the doctor could believe
that ignoring this new medicine does not make him a bad doctor). However, for
i to be ashamed (in front of itself or another agent), it is necessary that i shares
the normative standard imposed in condition (3), in order to feel concerned by
its violation. For example, wiping your nose in public is very impolite in Japan;
if one does not know it but realises it while wiping their nose in public, one has
no reason to feel ashamed unless one recognises de facto this standard as having
to be respected. Finally, as explained above, an agent can also be ashamed both
in front of itself and in front of someone else, at the same time.
3 Formal framework
3.1 Basic language and mental attitudes
Let AGT be the finite set of agents and 2AGT∗ = 2AGT \ ∅. Let ATM be the set
of atomic formulas and ATM i ⊆ ATM for any i ∈ AGT the finite set of those
representing properties of agent i. The language LSL of the logic of shame SL is
defined by the following BNF:
ϕ :: p | pi | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | MBelG ϕ | Goal i ϕ | NStand i ϕ
where p ∈ ATM , pi ∈ ATM i, i ∈ AGT and G ∈ 2AGT∗. The other classical
connectors (⊤, ⊥, ∧, → and ↔) are defined in the usual way. pi reads: p is a
property of agent i; MBelG ϕ reads: “the fact that ϕ is true is a mutual belief
of the group of agents G”. Goal i ϕ reads: “agent i [has the chosen goal/prefers]
that ϕ”. (This is a goal à la Cohen&Levesque6; see [14].) NStand i ϕ reads: “ϕ is
a normative standard of agent i that is particularly important to i”. 7
We define some abbreviations summarized in Fig. 1:
6 As in [12], these goals can come from desires (intrinsically endogenous to an indi-
vidual), from internalised norms, or from exogenous goals imposed on the individual
(see [13] for more details). Therefore the satisfaction of a chosen goal is not neces-
sarily positive for the agent, but “less negative” than its non-satisfaction. Moreover,
goals are not necessarily realistic: an agent can have a goal without believing that it
can be achieved sometime. Finally goals are not necessarily achievement goals: i can
have a goal that ϕ without believing that ϕ is false, and without wanting to make
ϕ true if it is false. Goals are therefore semantically represented by sets of preferred
worlds; we use “(chosen) goal” and “preference” as synonymous.
7 This means that ϕ is an internalised standard for i, that is, i commands itself to
respect it [15]. In this sense, i is morally responsible for the realisation of ϕ. The fact
that this represents a normative standard particularly important for i is consistent
with the type of internalised norms described by [9, p. 142–143] or [5]. The agent is
likely to lose face when violating this type of standard.
pG
de´f
=
∧
i∈G
pi (DefpG)
p∅
de´f
=
∧
i∈AGT
¬pi (Defp∅)
BelG ϕ
de´f
=
∧
i∈G
MBel{i} ϕ (DefBelG )
Bel i ϕ
de´f
= MBel{i} ϕ
de´f
= Bel{i} ϕ (DefBeli )
GoalG ϕ
de´f
=
∧
i∈G
Goal i ϕ (DefGoalG )
NStandG ϕ
de´f
=
∧
i∈G
NStand i ϕ (DefNStandG )
Fig. 1. Abbreviations of the langage where i, j ∈ AGT , G ∈ 2AGT∗
(DefpG) means that property p is shared by all agents in group G; (Defp∅)
means that no agent in AGT has property p; (DefBelG ) reads: ϕ is a shared
belief of all agents in group G; (DefBeli ) reads: agent i believes that ϕ is true;
(DefGoalG ) reads ϕ is a preference shared by all agents in group G; (DefNStandG )
reads ϕ is a normative standard shared by all agents in group G and particularly
important to them.
3.2 Semantics
SL-frames. SL-frames are tuples F = 〈W,B,G, I〉 where: W is a non-empty set
of possible worlds; B : AGT −→ W ×W maps each agent i with a transitive
euclidean relation Bi ⊆W ×W between possible worlds; G : AGT −→ W ×W
maps each agent i with a serial relation Gi ⊆ W ×W between possible worlds;
I : AGT −→W×W maps each agent i with a serial relation Ii ⊆W×W between
possible worlds. In the following, we note R(w) = {w′ ∈W : (w,w′) ∈ R}.
Bi(w) is the belief state of agent i in world w. Each accessibility relation is
transitive and euclidean (see the constraints (SC1) in Fig. 2).8 Gi(w) is the set
of preferred worlds of agent i in the world w, and each relation Gi is serial (SC2).
Ii(w) is the set of ideal worlds of agent i in the world w, and each relation Ii
is serial (SC3). We also impose that each agent is aware of its preferred worlds
8 Traditionally, this relation is also serial, meaning that Bi(w) cannot be empty. In
other words, if agent i believes ϕ in w then there necessarily exists a world accessible
from w via B where ϕ is true. Here, we do not impose this seriality constraint so
Bi(w) can be empty, meaning that an agent can have contradictory beliefs with-
out making the logic contradictory. This technical choice is made necessary by the
semantics of public announcements: indeed public announcements can remove acces-
sible worlds, possibly leaving no accessible world at all, which is contradictory with
seriality.
(SC4) and of its ideal worlds (SC5): the worlds representing its goals and its
standards from w are the same as those accessible from its epistemic worlds.
(SC1). if w′ ∈ Bi(w) then Bi(w) = Bi(w
′)
(SC2). Gi(w) 6= ∅
(SC3). Ii(w) 6= ∅
(SC4). if w′ ∈ Bi(w) then Gi(w) = Gi(w
′)
(SC5). if w′ ∈ Bi(w) then Ii(w) = Ii(w
′)
Fig. 2. Semantical constraints where w ∈ W , i ∈ AGT
SL-models. SL-models areM = 〈F, V 〉 with F a SL-frame and V : ATM −→ 2W
a valuation function. For each formula ϕ, each modelM and each world w of this
model, M,w  ϕ reads “ϕ is true in world w of model M ”. We denote M,w 6 ϕ
the fact that M,w  ¬ϕ. Truth conditions are as follows:
– M,w  p iff w ∈ V (p);
– M,w  ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that M,w  ϕ;
– M,w  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w  ϕ and M,w  ψ;
– M,w  MBelG ϕ for every G ∈ 2AGT∗ iff M,w′  ϕ for every w′ ∈
(
⋃
i∈G Bi)
+(w) where (
⋃
i∈G Bi)
+ is the transitive closure of the union of
the G’s epistemic accessibility relations;
– M,w  Goal i ϕ iff M,w
′
 ϕ for every w′ ∈ Gi(w);
– M,w  NStand i ϕ iff M,w
′
 ϕ for every w′ ∈ Ii(w).
A formula ϕ is true in a SL-model M iff M,w  ϕ for each world w of M . ϕ is
valid iff ϕ is true in each SL-model (we then note SL ϕ). ϕ is satisfiable iff it is
not valid.
3.3 Axiomatics
It follows from our semantics that operators MBelG (for every G ∈ 2
AGT∗) are
defined in the K4 logic, and operators Bel i (for i ∈ AGT ) in the K45 logic (see
[16]). We can prove the validity of the following properties (for each G ∈ 2AGT∗
and i ∈ G):
MBelG ϕ→ BelG ϕ (MBel1)
MBelG ϕ→ MBelG′ ϕ pour tout G
′ ∈ 2G∗ (MBel2)
MBelG ϕ↔
∧
i∈G
Bel iMBelG ϕ (MBel3)
¬Bel i ϕ→ ¬Bel iMBelG ϕ (MBel4)
¬Bel i MBelG ϕ→ ¬MBelG ϕ (MBel5)
The operators Goal i and NStand i are defined in a normal logic KD and,
thanks to the semantic constraints, the logic SL verifies the following principles:
Goal i ϕ→ Bel i Goal i ϕ (PIgoal)
¬Goal i ϕ→ Bel i ¬Goal i ϕ (NIgoal)
NStand i ϕ→ Bel iNStand i ϕ (PInstand)
¬NStand i ϕ→ Bel i ¬NStand i ϕ (NInstand)
These properties respectively mean that if an agent has (resp. does not have) a
certain preference or a certain internalised normative standard, then it believes
that it has it (resp. does not have it).
3.4 Extension to public announcements
We now want to be able to express properties such as “after the agents have
learned some piece of information, agent i will be ashamed”, in order to allow
reasoning about the dynamics of shame in a MAS. For instance an agent i can
want to avoid making some proposition ϕ true if it believes that when the a
group G learns about ϕ, i will feel ashamed in front of them. Shame-avoidance
is thus used as a motivation for (not) acting (see Section 4.1). We therefore
extend the language of logic SL with modal operators of public announcements
[17] by adding [ϕ!]ϕ to the BNF defined above. We ground on the framework
defined by [18] and extend it with operators of mutual beliefs and internalised
normative standards. [ϕ!]ψ reads “ψ is true after the public announcement of ϕ”.
The associated semantics is defined as an update of a SL-model: the update
of M = 〈W,B,G, I, V 〉 by ϕ! is the model Mϕ! = 〈Wϕ!,Bϕ!,Gϕ!, Iϕ!, V ϕ!〉 such
that:
Wϕ! = {ub : u ∈W} ∪ {uc : u ∈ W}
B
ϕ! = {(ub, vb) : v ∈ B(u) et M, v  ϕ} ∪ {(uc, vc) : v ∈ B(u)}
Gϕ! = {(ub, vc) : v ∈ G(u)} ∪ {(uc, vc) : v ∈ G(u)}
Iϕ! = {(ub, vc) : v ∈ I(u)} ∪ {(uc, vc) : v ∈ I(u)}
V ϕ!(ub) = V
ϕ!(uc) = V (u)
Intuitively, the worlds are duplicated in two groups: one relative to beliefs (ub)
and one relative to preferences and standards (uc). Regarding accessibility rela-
tions, they are integrally reproduced in this latter group while in the former:
– only the elements of the epistemic relation leading to worlds where the an-
nounced formula is true are kept;
– the elements of the relations G and I are duplicated in such a way that
the departure world is a world relative to belief and the arrival world is a
preferred world or an ideal world (vc).
Bi
Gi
ϕ
¬ϕ
¬ϕ
¬ϕ
Bi
Bi
Gi
Gi
u
v1
v2
v3
v4
Bi
Gi
ϕ
¬ϕ
¬ϕ
¬ϕ
Bi
Bi
Gi
Gi
Bi
ϕ
ub
vb1
vb2
vb4
vb3
¬ϕ
¬ϕ
¬ϕ
vc4
uc
vc3
vc1
vc2
ϕ!
Gi
Gi
Gi
Modèle M Modèle Mϕ!
Fig. 3. Example where M,u  ¬Bel i ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i ¬ϕ while M
ϕ!, ub  Bel i ϕ
Example 1. An example is given in Figure 3. To simplify, the starting model
M = 〈W,B,G, I, V 〉 only contains elements of Bi and of Gi and we suppose
that W = {u, v1, v2, v3, v4}. For instance, let ϕ be a formula that means “it is
sunny”; ¬Bel i ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i ¬ϕ then means “agent i does not know if it is sunny
or not”, and Bel i ϕ means “agent i believes it is sunny”. The new model M
ϕ!
stemming from the announcement of ϕ! hasWϕ! as its set of worlds, whereWϕ! =
{ub, vb1 , vb2 , vb3 , vb4}∪{uc, vc1 , vc2 , vc3 , vc4}. We can see that all formulas true in
M,u are true in Mϕ!, ub except the fact that: M,u  ¬Bel i ϕ∧¬Bel i ¬ϕ (while
M,u 6 Bel i ϕ) and M
ϕ!, ub  Bel i ϕ (while M
ϕ!, ub 6 ¬Bel i ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i ¬ϕ). In
other words, before the update agent i did not know whether ϕ was true or not
(e.g. , whether it was sunny or not), and after the update i believes that ϕ is
true (e.g. , i believes it is sunny). The announcement has therefore extended the
beliefs of agent i.
Proposition 1. For each formula ϕ, if M is a SL-model then Mϕ! is also a
SL-model.
and the truth condition associated to public announcements is the following:
– M,u  [ϕ!]ψ ssi Mϕ!, ub  ψ
The previous notions of true formula in a SL-model, of validity and satisfia-
bility are extended to take public announcements into account.
We can show that the truth conditions associated to the operators make the
following properties valid:
SL [ϕ!]p↔ p où p ∈ ATM (RAp)
SL [ϕ!]¬ψ ↔ ¬[ϕ!]ψ (RAn)
SL [ϕ!](ψ1 ∧ ψ2)↔ [ϕ!]ψ1 ∧ [ϕ!]ψ2 (RAa)
SL [ϕ!]Bel i ψ ↔ Bel i (ϕ→ [ϕ!]ψ) (RAb)
SL [ϕ!]Goal i ψ ↔ Goal i ψ (RAg)
SL [ϕ!]NStand i ψ ↔ NStand i ψ (RAv)
(RAp) means that a public announcement does not change facts, goals (RAg)
or standards (RAv) of an agent. (RAn) means that a formula is false after an
announcement iff it is false that this formula is true after the announcement.
(RAa) means that two facts are true after an announcement iff each of them is
separately true after this announcement. Finally, (RAb) means that a belief of
agent i is true after an announcement iff this agent believes that if the content
of this announcement is true then after the announcement of this content the
objet of this belief will be true.
We can prove from the previous properties that:
SL [ϕ!]⊤ (N[ϕ!])
We can also prove that the following rules of equivalence keep their validity:
if ψ ↔ ψ′ then [ϕ!]ψ ↔ [ϕ!]ψ′ (RE[ϕ!])
if ϕ↔ ϕ′ then [ϕ!]ψ ↔ [ϕ′!]ψ (RE′[ϕ!])
By definition [16, p. 115] the properties (RAa), (N[ϕ!]), (RE[ϕ!]) and (RAn)
imply that operators [ϕ!] are defined in a KD logic. The equivalences (RAp)
to (RAv) and inference rules (RE[ϕ!]) and (RE
′
[ϕ!]) above are called “reduction
axioms”: they allow to reduce any formula [ϕ!]ϕ to a formula that does not
contain any [ϕ!] operator. As shown by [17] there is no reduction axiom for
mutual belief and the axiomatics above is this incomplete.
Definition 1 (boolean formula and positive formula). For each p ∈ ATM ,
the set of boolean formulas is such that:
P ::= p | ¬P | P ∨ P
and the set of positive formulas is such that (i ∈ AGT , G ∈ 2AGT∗) :
ϕ+ ::= P | ϕ+ ∨ ϕ+ | ϕ+ ∧ ϕ+ | MBelG ϕ
+ | Goal i ϕ
+ | NStand i ϕ
+
For example, Bel i ¬p, Goal iMBelG (p∨¬q) and p→ Bel i p are positive formulas,
but not Bel i Bel j p→ Bel i p (because this formula is equivalent to ¬Bel i Bel j p∨
Bel i p and ¬Bel i Bel j p is not a positive formula).
Finally, we can prove the following properties for each i ∈ AGT , G ∈ 2AGT∗:
[ϕ!]Bel i ϕ (1)
[ϕ!]MBelG ϕ (2)
ϕ+ → [ψ!]ϕ+ (3)
¬Bel i ¬P → [P !]¬Bel i ¬P (4)
Bel i [ϕ!]ψ → [ϕ!]Bel i ψ (5)
(1) and (2) respectively mean that after ϕ has been announced, all agents believe
(resp. mutually believe) that ϕ is true. (3) means that any positive formula stays
true after any announcement. See [17] for the proof of these three properties. (5)
means that if an agent believes that ψ will be true after the announcement of
ϕ, then after the announcement of ϕ this agent will believe that ψ is true. (This
property can be easily proven from (RAb) and principles of the logic.)
4 Formalisation
Definition 2. For each agent i ∈ AGT , each group of agents G ∈ 2AGT∗ and
each formula pi ∈ ATM i:
Shamei (G,ϕ, pi)
de´f
= Bel iMBelG ϕ∧
Bel iMBelG (ϕ→ ¬pi)∧
Bel iMBelG∪{i}NStandG∪{i} pi∧
Goal i Bel j pi
Shamei (G,ϕ, pi) reads: “agent i feels shame in front of group G that ϕ is true, in
relation with property pi” and the elements of the disjunction correspond to the
properties presented in the previous section. (In particular, the last component
means that agent i prefers that j believes that i has the property p.) According
to these properties, the agent i can feel shame:
– in front of himself only (when G is reduced to {i});
– in front of a group G only (and not in front of himself) when it does not
belong to it (when i 6∈ G);
– both (when G = G′ ∪ {i} with G′ 6= ∅ and i 6∈ G′).
Definition 3. For each agent i ∈ AGT , each group of agents G ∈ 2AGT∗ and
each formula pi ∈ ATM i:
Shamei (G,ϕ)
de´f
=
∨
pi∈ATM i
Shamei (G,ϕ, pi)
Shamei (G,ϕ) reads: “agent i feels shame in front of group G that ϕ is true”
and it holds iff this agent feels shame in front of group G that ϕ is true in relation
with at least one property pi.
Finally, the fact that shame is defined from beliefs of agent i means that this
agent can be mistaken and feel shame for something in front of a certain group
while this group does not really have the required beliefs or normative standards
(agent i has wrong beliefs).
It is easy to prove that:
SL Shamei (G,ϕ, pi)→ Shamei ({i}, ϕ, pi) ssi i ∈ G (SH1)
SL Shamei (G,ϕ, pi)→ Bel iMBelG∪{i}NStand i pi (SH2)
SL Shamei (G,ϕ, pi)→ Shamei (G
′, ϕ, pi) pour tout G
′ ∈ 2G∗ (SH3)
SL Shamei (G,ϕ, pi)→ Bel i Shamei (G,ϕ, pi) (SH5)
SL ¬Shame i (G,ϕ, pi)→ Bel i ¬Shame i (G,ϕ, pi) (SH6)
(SH1) illustrates the fact that if agent i feels shame in front of a group G that
it belongs to, then i feels shame in front of itself. (SH2) does not presuppose that
i necessarily belongs to group G and illustrates the fact that even when i feels
shame in front of a group G that it does not belong to (i is thus not ashamed
in front of himself) there must be a mutual belief between agent i and agents in
group G that pi is a moral value of i. (SH3) represents the fact that if agent i
feels shame in front of a group G then i feels shame in front of any non-empty
subgroup G′ of G. (SH5) and (SH6) illustrate the fact that an agent is aware if
what it is, and of what it is not, ashamed of.
Example 2 (Absence of shame). Let’s consider G = {Tom,Maxim ,Kenzo}
such that G ⊆ AGT , untidy ∈ ATM meaning that Tom’s room is untidy,
coolTom ∈ ATMTom meaning that Tom has the property to be cool, and
coolAGT meaning that everybody has the property to be cool. Maxim and Kenzo
come to Tom’s home to play with him, and they see that his room is untidy
(MBelG untidy). None of them considers that having his room untidy makes
Tom “uncool” (
∧
i∈G ¬Bel i (untidy → ¬coolTom)) and they believe that it is
particularly important to be cool (MBelG NStandG coolAGT ). Finally, each of
them prefers that the others believe he/she is cool (
∧
i∈G Goal i BelG\{i} cool i).
It is easy to show that Tom is not ashamed in front of his friends that his room
is untidy (because he does not believe that this untidines makes him uncool).
Formally, if we note KB2 the set of all these facts, this is illustrated by the
validity of the following principle:SL KB2 → ¬ShameTom (G, untidy , coolTom).
Example 3 (Shame in front of others). In this new example, we replace the
first two hypotheses of the previous example with the three following ones (and
we keep the other two): everybody has seen Tom’s room tidy (MBelG tidy) and
Tom believes that Maxim and Kenzo mutually believe that this makes him uncool
(BelTom MBel{Maxim,Kenzo} (tidy → ¬coolTom)), although he does not share this
opinion (¬BelTom (tidy → ¬coolTom)). This facts constitute the initial set KB3.
From this example and the principles of our logic, we can show that Tom feels
shame in front of Maxim and Kenzo (but not in front of himself) that his room
is tidy. So, formally:
1. SL KB3 → ShameTom ({Maxim ,Kenzo}, tidy).
2. SL KB3 → ¬ShameTom ({Tom}, tidy).
Example 4 (Absence of shame due to uninterest in being liked). In this third
example, Tom believes that his brother Arthur knows that his room is tidy,
and that in Arthur’s view this makes Tom uncool. It is obvious for Tom and
Arthur that ideally one should be cool. But since it is his brother, Tom does
not especially prefer at that time that Arthur believes that Tom is cool (that is,
¬GoalTom BelArthur coolTom ∧ ¬GoalTom ¬BelArthur coolTom).
Consequently, Tom does not feel any shame in front of his brother for his
room being tidy even if this makes him uncool, which is negative per se (the
formula Shamei ({Arthur}, tidy, coolTom) is false).
4.1 Dynamics of shame
We have said above that shame may be driving some of our behaviours. We
thus propose in the following to formally illustrate this aspect. The reactions we
adopt when ashamed are context-dependent, so we first set here the frame that
will serve as a running example in the sequel of this section.
Example 5 (Shame and belief evolution). Let’s again consider Tom and his un-
tidy room (KB5a), of which he is aware (KB5b). Like any teenager, he wants
to project a positive self-image to his friends: Maxim and Kenzo of course, but
also Lila, his new girlfriend (KB5c). He knows that he and his two mates share
the belief that one can have an untidy room and still be cool (KB5d). He does
not believe either that having an untidy room shows immaturity, but he ignores
Lila’s opinion on this point (KB5f).
Let AGT = {Tom,Kenzo,Maxim ,Lila} be the set of all agents and ATM =
{untidy, coolAGT ,matureAGT} the set of all atomic formulas. The initial base of
facts KB5 is as follows:
untidy (KB5a)
BelTom untidy (KB5b)
GoalTom BelAGT coolTom (KB5c)
BelTom MBel{Tom,Maxim,Kenzo} ¬(untidy → ¬coolTom) (KB5d)
BelTom ¬(untidy → ¬matureTom) (KB5e)
¬BelTom BelLila (untidy → ¬matureTom)∧
¬BelTom ¬BelLila (untidy → ¬matureTom)
(KB5f)
MBelAGT NStandAGT (coolAGT ∧matureAGT ) (KB5g)
When friends enter Tom’s room and find it untidy, this counts for us as a public
announcement of untidy !. After this announcement, all agents thus mutually
believe that Tom’s room is untidy and Tom believes that this mutual belief
holds ([untidy!]BelTom MBelAGT untidy); in particular Tom keeps believing it
([untidy !]BelTom untidy). Of course, the room is still untidy ([untidy !]untidy)
and all of Tom’s beliefs and preferences are preserved by the announcement (if ϕ
represents one of the facts between (KB5c) and (KB5g) then we have [untidy!]ϕ).
By definition of shame, it is immediate to see that Tom does not feel any
shame in front of anyone after the announcement untidy!. On the contrary,
if this first announcement is followed by another announcement: Lila declares
that she believes untidiness to be a sign of immaturity (i.e. BelLila (untidy →
¬matureTom)! is announced), then Tom will feel shame in front of her regarding
this property. It is then quite immediate that:
SL KB5 → [desordre!][BelLila (untidy → ¬matureTom)!]
ShameTom ({Lila}, untidy,matureTom)
which means that the initial situation is enough to show that after everybody is
informed that Tom’s room is untidy, and then that Lila considers that as a lack
of maturity, Tom feels shame in front of Lila that his room is not tidy because
he believes that this negates his maturity in the eyes of Lila.
From (KB5d) we can also show that at no instant (before the first announce-
ment, between the first and second announcements, and after the second an-
nouncement) Tom feels shame in front of himself, Kenzo and/or Maxim about
the untidiness of his room (since this untidiness does not make Tom uncool in
their eyes).
SL KB5 → ¬ShameTom ({Tom,Kenzo,Maxim}, untidy, coolTom)
SL KB5 → [desordre!]
¬ShameTom ({Tom ,Kenzo,Maxim}, untidy, coolTom)
SL KB5 → [desordre!][BelLila (untidy → ¬matureTom)!]
¬ShameTom ({Tom ,Kenzo,Maxim}, untidy, coolTom)
5 Related works
Emotions have already been formalised by various authors: for instance [19]
provide a first formalisation of emotions; [4] studies the intensity of emotions;
Steunebrink and colleagues [20] formalise Ortony, Clore and Collins’ theory of
emotions. We have also proposed such a formalisation ourselves [21].
In [22], Steunebrink and colleagues formalise shame from Ortony et al.’s
theory [9]. ShameTi (j:α) is read “shame about action α of agent j is triggered
for agent i”. It is logically defined as the fact that: i perceives a performance
of an action α by agent j; this action α is blameworthy from i’s point of view;
and i identifies with agent j (Ortony et al. talk of “cognitive unit”). They only
consider shame about actions of others, and view this emotion as a kind of
moral disapprobation about these actions. We believe that this is only a very
specific kind of shame. On the contrary our formalisation does not consider
any responsibility but only the resulting state (of possible actions of i, j, or
any other agent). Moreover, Steunebrink et al.’s formalisation does not allow to
differentiate between shame in front of oneself and shame in front of others. It
seems that in this case, agent i is always ashamed in front of itself (agent j does
not play the same role as in our definition, but is just the author of action α).
Shame has been formally investigated by Turrini et al. in [23] that is also
based on Castelfranchi et al.’s work on shame and guilt. They aim to formalise
shame and guilt and their associated coping strategies. Our goal is less ambitious
than theirs and we have only focused here on appraisal conditions. Following
Castelfranchi, in [23] the main appraisal condition of shame is based on the fact
that an ashamed agent has “the belief of not having had a capacity to get over a
bad state” (see p. 406). We do not agree with this requirement for two reasons.
First, in [23], this incapacity to get over a bad state is taken into account in
the appraisal conditions of shame by the fact that the agent that is ashamed
“believes that there was no good alternative” (p. 413). This fact is formalised
as: the agent believes that, after every other action that the agent could have
performed instead of the action that he has really performed, the result would
have been the same bad state. But it is too strong: experimental results (see
[2] for instance) show that capacity may also concern willingness: the agent
could have prevented this bad effect but he has not had the willingness, the
moral strength, for not performing what he performed. Following the example
of Clinton and Monica analysed in [23], Clinton may be ashamed about what
he did with Monica, but he cannot say that he could not have prevented what
happened in the sense that, whatever action he could perform, this action would
have led to a state of the world where he had had an inappropriate relationship
with Monica. It seems more intuitive to consider that he believes he has not had
the moral strength to get over a bad state (whereas, from the point of view of
the possible actions, there existed other actions that, if performed, would not
have led to the current situation).
Second, from our point of view and related to the first point, the belief that
we could not have prevented the current bad state of affairs seems to be more
a consequence of shame, a kind of coping strategy, rather than an appraisal
condition in itself. Clinton (physically) could have done otherwise, but he did
not have the (moral) strength to avoid doing what he should not have done (or
to do what he should have done). (One often tries to explain, or rationalise, what
one did while one should not have.) Thus, for these two reasons, we do not have
this condition in our formalisation. In this sense, we are closer to [5] where this
condition is not required either.
6 Conclusion
We showed that shame is a complex emotion but can still be formalised. One
can feel shame in front of oneself or other people. Shame involves both strong
ideals (generally the necessity not to lose face in front of people whose opinion
matters) and a causality between a given situation and its impact on self-image.
Contrarily to guilt where one feels responsible for having (or not having) done a
certain action, shame does not require this condition (even though it can hold in
certain cases). Thus one can feel shame for one’s hair colour or for one’s origins
without feeling responsible for these.
As we said at the start of this paper, shame is a powerful mediator of our so-
cial behaviour. Numerous studies, notably in the field of game theory in economy,
show that individuals can be more or less sensitive to the feelings of shame and
guilt (they talk about “guilt aversion” or “shame aversion”). One of the central
aspects to handle this problem is the “action tendency” component. The sequel
of this work will consist in introducing physical actions and rules of the type: if
agent i has shame-aversion and he believes that after some facts are revealed he
will feel shame, then he will adopt the goal to make one of the conditions of this
shame false, for example by preventing these facts from being revealed.
We can formally illustrate this point on the example 5 if we suppose that Tom
has shame-aversion. Since: (1) on the one hand he believes his friends will come
visit his room (and discover it is untidy), and (2) on the other hand he does not
know if this untidiness is a criterion of immaturity for Lila (by whom he wants to
be positively evaluated), we could assign Tom an anticipation behaviour where
he would for example clean his room to avoid shame. Another person, having a
weaker shame aversion, could be more optimistic and bet on the fact that Lila
would not consider untidiness as a sign of immaturity. Finally, someone having
very little (or no) shame-aversion could accept to feel ashamed in front of Lila
for the untidiness of his room. This aspect will constitute the next step of our
research.
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